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Abstract
We address physical layer security in distributed antenna (DA) systems, where eavesdroppers (Eves)
can intercept the information transmitted for the intended receiver (IR). To realize a user-centric, power-
efficient and physical layer security-addressing system, we aim at minimizing total power consumption
by jointly designing DA selection and secure precoding. Different from the conventional artificial noise
(AN)-aided secure transmission, where AN is treated as an undesired element for the IR, we design AN
such that it is constructive to the IR while keeping destructive to the Eves. Importantly, we investigate
two practical scenarios, where the IR and Eves’ channel state information (CSI) is imperfectly obtained
or the Eves’ CSI is completely unknown. To handle the CSI uncertainties, we solve the problems
in probabilistic and deterministic robust optimization respectively, both satisfying the IR’ signal-to-
interference-and-ratio (SINR) requirement by use of constructive AN and addressing security against
the Eves. Simulation results demonstrate our algorithms consume much less power compared to the
centralized antenna (CA) systems with/without antenna selection, as well as the DA systems with
conventional AN processing. Last but not least, by the proposed algorithms, the activation of DAs
closely relates to users’ locations and quality-of-service (QoS) requirements, featuring a user-centric
and on-demand structure.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Communications for the future Internet of Things (IoT) and Industry 4.0 are required
to provide power-efficient transmission together with high security level [1]. In the last decade,
centralized multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) has been considered as a potential technique
due to its high throughput [2] and additional spatial diversity for enhancing physical layer
security [3]. However, it requires extremely high power consumption caused by the fully activated
antennas, and centralized MIMO often suffers from an equal level of path loss (PL) from the
antenna array to one user caused by the co-located antenna (CA) deployment [4]. Besides,
edge users in CA deployment may not be well served due to the severe propagation attenu-
ation, otherwise significant transmission power is required for compensating the propagation
loss. To create a user-centric and power efficient structure necessary for the IoT and Industry
4.0, distributed antenna (DA) systems have attracted much attention [5]. By geographically
distributing the antennas and hence placing them closer to users, DA systems can reduce the
PL impact and obtain blockage-free effect and also facilitate an on-demand network structure
by activating those DAs contributing the most. The concepts of user-centric DA are particularly
suited for communications in industrial environments, where antennas can be carefully planned
and distributed in the ceilings of large factories to effectively extend network coverage without
crucial increment of power consumption, and are therefore a key contender for industry IoT and
Industry 4.0 deployments. It was pointed out in the FP7 EARTH project [6] that for a small-scale
communication node (such as DA, femto or pico node), the power consumption is dominated
by the power amplifier (PA) and circuit power. Generally, PA power consumption is closely
related to the transmission power and drain efficiency at transmitters. On the other hand, circuit
power consumption contains multiple power consuming components. The power consumption
of an active DA mainly comes from digital/analog converter, analog/digital, optical/electrical
converter, up-converter, filter, synthesizer, mixers, etc [7], while the power consumption of one
DA can be significantly reduced by switching it off [8].
Nevertheless, it should be noticed that with the advantages in DA systems, due to the proximity
to transmitting antennas, it is also easier for potential eavesdroppers (Eves) to obtain the signal
transmitted to the intended receiver (IR), and physical layer security issue in DA systems becomes
more challenging. In the past decades, physical layer security has been extensively investigated
as a complement to secure wireless communications, where artificial noise (AN) is generated at
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3transmitter to jam potential Eves. When the Eves’ channel state information (CSI) is unknown
at the transmitter, isotropic AN could be generated into the null space of the IR’s channel [9].
When the Eves’ CSI is known at the transmitter, AN could be injected to the direction of Eves
in a spatial manner, which is more efficient than the isotropic transmission [10]. Regardless
of isotropic or spatial AN transmission, AN is treated as an undesired element at the IR and
its leakage effect needs to be minimized by precoding design [11]. Based on AN-aided secure
transmission, secrecy rate [12] [13] [14], outage probability [15] and power consumption [3]
have been addressed recently. Zhou el in [12] derived an analytical closed-form expression of
achievable secrecy rate over fading channel. Wang el in [13] extended the secrecy rate into a
two-hop relay system, where the relay is powered by energy harvesting. The authors in [14]
further extended secrecy rate into a two-way relay system. In [15], the authors investigated the
outage probability of the IR in cognitive systems. On the specific topic of secure transmission in
DA systems, the authors in [16] investigated SINR maximization problem for DA systems, where
AN is generated by DAs to interfere the Eves. The authors in [17] maximized the ergodic secrecy
rate in DA systems, where AN and signal are jointly designed and transmitted at each DA. In
[3], the power minimization problem was demonstrated for DA systems, where the potential
Eves are considered as idle IRs and scavenge energy from AN.
The aforementioned research, however, treated AN as a catastrophic element and mitigated the
effect of AN at the IR as much as possible. If AN can be carefully designed at the transmitter, it
may be beneficial to the IR in terms of improving signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)
based on the concept of constructive interference (CI). The concept of CI was firstly introduced
by [18] in CDMA system. Then a rotated zero-forcing (ZF) precoding scheme was proposed
in [18] that partially CI can be utilized while the destructive interference should be suppressed,
and [19] further proposed that all the interference can be constructive by designing precoding
in symbol level. The concept of CI was adapted to beamforming optimization in [20] in the
context of symbol scaling, and subsequently in [21] and [22]. Recently, the concept of CI was
applied into cognitive radio [23], large-scale multi-input multi-output (MIMO) [24], multiuser
multi-input single-output (MISO) [25], wireless power transfer [26] and constant envelop systems
[27], Based on the aforementioned work in CI design, the authors in [28] proposed a scheme
to utilize AN in a CA system. However, the fully activated antennas in [28] lead to enormous
power consumption.
Motivated by the aforementioned issues, in this paper, we present joint design of DA selection
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4and secure precoding to minimize total power consumption, subjected to physical layer security
constraints. Importantly, we consider two practical scenarios and solve the problems from two
different prospectives of robust optimizations, namely probabilistic and deterministic robust
optimizations. Our contributions are summarized in the following:
1) We investigate the power minimization problem under the IR’s QoS requirement and
physical layer security constraints against Eves. DA selection vector and precoding are
jointly designed to fully utilize the additional degrees of freedom in antennas’ activa-
tion/deactivation and beneficial effect of AN, which is shown to significantly reduce the
total power consumption yet maintaining the IR’s SINR and security constraints against
the Eves.
2) We exploit joint DA selection and robust precoding in two practical scenarios: first, when
the IR and Eves’ CSI is imperfectly obtained, and second, when the Eves’ CSI is completely
unknown. Then we investigate the total power minimization problems for the two scenarios
in probabilistic and deterministic manners, respectively. In the first scenario, the IR’s SINR
and the security against the Eves are issued by chance constrained formulations from the
prospective of probabilistic robust optimization, while the IR’s SINR and security against
the Eves are guaranteed with all the CSI uncertainties from the prospective of deterministic
robust optimization. On the other hand, when the Eves’s CSI in completely unknown at
the transmitter side in the second scenario, the IR’s SINR requirement is addressed by the
probabilistic or deterministic robust optimization, while the security towards the Eves is
addressed by confining a minimum power level of AN.
3) Four corresponding low-complexity algorithms are proposed to minimize total power
consumption for the two scenarios in terms of probabilistic and deterministic manners,
and at the same time AN is kept constructive to the IR whereas destructive to the Eves.
Complexities of the algorithms are analytically demonstrated.
4) A user-centric network structure is demonstrated by the proposed schemes, compared to
the CA counterpart. Explicitly, the working status of each DA is flexibly determined by
the IR and Eves’ positions to provide on-demand services: the DAs close to users have
higher probabilities of activation, while the DAs far from users have higher probabilities of
being idle for saving power. Furthermore, the power consumption of the DA deployment
remains low regardless of the users’ positions and power-efficient transmission is always
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5featured, while the power consumption of the CA deployment demonstrates a significant
increment when the users move to edge area.
Notations: Matrices and vectors are represented by boldface capital and lower case letters,
respectively. | · | denotes the absolute value of a complex scalar. || · || denotes the Euclidean
vector norm. AH AT and Tr(A) denote the Hermitian transpose, transpose and trace of matrix
A. Rank(A) denote the rank of matrix A. diag (A) returns a diagonal matrix with diagonal
elements from matrix A and diag (a) stacks the elements of vector a into a diagonal matrix.
A  0 means A is a positive semi-definite matrix. Superscript n denotes the n-th DA’ index
or the n-th element of a vector. ‖ · ‖p means the p-norm of a vector or a matrix. In means a
n-by-n identity matrix. < and = represent the real part and imaginary parts, respectively. CN×M
and HN×M denote sets of all N ×M matrices and Hermitian matrices with complex entries.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND CONSTRUCTIVE INTERFERENCE
In this section, system model is introduced in II-A and the concept of CI is briefly discussed
in II-B.
A. System Model
We consider a DA system at downlink transmission, which is depicted in Fig. 1. All DA
ports are connected to the central unit through a noise-free wired front-haul for cooperative
communications. Central unit is equipped with N DAs transmitting confidential message to the
IR in the presence of K possible Eves. The IR and Eves are all equipped with single antenna
for simplicity. CSI is obtained by channel estimation in the training phase, based on channel
reciprocity as in [5] [29]. Without loss of generality, we assume that all the DAs share the same
drain efficiency and their PAs work in the linear region. Per-DA power constraint is applied,
which is essentially different from joint power constraint in CA systems.
B. Constructive Interference
CI is the interference pushes to received signals aways from the detection threshold [19]. The
increased distance to the detection threshold can effectively improve the receiving performance.
Denote w ∈ CN×1 and z ∈ CN×1 as precoding and AN at the transmitter side. Denote xd = dejφd
as the information-bearing symbol transmitted for the IR. The received signal at the IR and the
k-th Eve can be calculated as
December 13, 2018 DRAFT
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Fig. 1. Illustration of system model, where DAs are geographically positioned.
yd = h
T
d (wxd + z) + nd, yk = h
T
k (wxd + z) + nk, (1)
where hd ∈ CN×1 denotes the channel conditions between the DAs and the IR. hk ∈ CN×1
denotes the channel conditions between the DAs and the k-th Eve. nd ∼ CN (0, σ2n) and nk ∼
CN (0, σ2n) denote the Additive white Gaussian noises (AWGN) at the IR and the k-th Eve,
respectively. Conventionally, the received SINR at the IR and k-th Eve are denoted as
Γd =
|hTdw|2
σ2n + |hTd z|2
, Γk =
|hTkw|2
σ2n + |hTk z|2
, (2)
where Γd and Γk denote the IR and the k-th Eve’s SINR, respectively. It can be seen from (2)
that AN is treated as an undesired element at the IR. By contrast, the principle of constructive
AN is to rotate the phase of the AN at transmitter and to align it with the desired signal at the
IR. Since the transmitted signal can be also written as (w+ze−jφd)xd, according to the principle
of CI, the requirement of generating constructive AN can be given as
∠(hTd (w + ze−jφd)) = ∠(xd),
<{hTd (w + ze−jφd)}2
σ2n
≥ Γd, (3)
where ∠ represents the angle. The angular requirement in (3) is referred as strict phase rotation
CI design [25]. By exploiting the geometric interpretation in Fig. 2, non-strict phase rotation
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Fig. 2. Constructive and destructive AN for the IR and Eves with QPSK. (a) Constructive AN pushes the IR’s received symbols
towards the constructive region. (b) Destructive AN pushes the Eves’ received symbols towards the destructive region.
can be adopted to relax the strict angular requirement without loss of optimality [28], which is
mathematically given by
|={hTdw + hTd ze−jφd}| ≤ (<{hTdw + hTd ze−jφd} − σ
√
Γd) · tanθ, (4)
where θ = pi/M and M is constellation size [22]. It can be seen from (4) that the AN becomes
a beneficial element to the IR and the IR’ SINR Γd is also embedded. Since the AN contributes
to the useful signal power, the received SINR of the IR becomes into
γd =
|hTd (w + ze−jφd)|2
σ2n
, (5)
where the received SINR at the IR is improved by utilizing AN and thus transmission power
can be efficiently reduced to achieve a target SINR requirement.
III. POWER EFFICIENT DA SELECTION AND SECURE PRECODING WITH IMPERFECT CSI
In Section III, we investigate the power efficient design with imperfect CSI of all the nodes,
where the channels of all the nodes are given as hd = hˆd + ed and hk = hˆk + ek,∀k ∈ K.
hˆd ∈ CN×1 denotes the estimated channel between the DAs and the IR with estimation error
ed ∈ CN×1. hˆk ∈ CN×1 denotes the estimated channel between the DAs and the k-th Eve with
estimation error ek ∈ CN×1. We assume that the channel estimation error of the IR and the
k-th Eve follows normal distribution ed ∼ CN{0, σ2d} and ek ∼ CN{0, σ2k},∀k ∈ K. To fully
exploit the power efficient design with the uncertainties (CSI error), we handle the optimization
problem in probabilistic and deterministic manners, respectively.
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8A. Probabilistic Robust Optimization
1) Problem Formulation: Define precoding vector w ∈ CN×1, whose n-th element wn rep-
resents the precoding weight at the n-th DA. Define AN vector z ∈ CN×1, whose element
zn represents the AN generated at the n-th DA. Define DA selection vector t, whose element
tn = {0, 1} means the n-th DA is deactivated or activated, respectively. Taking advantage of
CI, AN is properly rotated such that it contributes to the received signal power at the IR while
remaining destructive to the Eves. To minimize the total power consumption, we jointly optimize
precoding w, AN z and DA selection vector t. Accordingly, the problem is formulated as
P1 (imperfect− prob) : argmin
w,z,t
||w + ze−jφd ||2
α
+
N∑
n=1
(
tnpon + (1− tn)poff
)
,
s.t (C1) : 0 ≤ |wn + zne−jφd |2 ≤ tnpDA,∀n ∈ N, (C2) : tn = {0, 1},∀n ∈ N,
(C3) : Pr{ Γd ≥ Γd|ed} ≥ ηd, (C4) : Pr{ Γk ≤ Γk|ek} ≥ ηk,∀k ∈ K,
(6)
where α is the drain efficiency of the DAs. pDA denotes the maximum available transmission
power at each DA. pon and poff represent the power consumption of each activated/deactivated
DA, respectively. Γd and Γk are the SINR requirement for the IR and physical layer security
against the k-th Eve. ηd and ηk denote the probabilistic thresholds for the IR and the k-th
Eve, respectively. Evidently, (C1) imposes individual transmission power constraint at each DA,
which is different from the joint transmission power constraint in CA systems. (C2) constrains the
selection vector to binary (on/off) elements. (C3) and (C4) guarantee that the SINR constraints
at the IR and the k-th Eve with probabilities greater than ηd and lower than ηk, ∀k ∈ K.
2) Solution to the Problem: To solve the problem, we first need to handle the probabilistic
constraints (C3) and (C4). Defining u = w + ze−jφd , under the provision of CI the constraint
(C3) equals to
(C3) : Pr{ Γd ≥ Γd|ed} ≥ ηd (4)⇒ Pr{|={hTd u}| ≤
(
<{hTd u} − σn
√
Γd
)
tanθ|ed} ≥ ηd ⇒
Pr{|={(hˆd + ed)Tu}| ≤
(
<{(hˆd + ed)Tu} − σn
√
Γd
)
tanθ|ed} ≥ ηd.
(7)
Decomposing the real part and imaginary parts, (7) is equivalent to the two constraints in (8).

Pr{σn
√
Γdtanθ + ˆhI,duR + ˆhR,duI + eI,duR + eR,duI
−( ˆhR,duR − ˆhI,duI + eR,duR − eI,duI)tanθ ≤ 0|ed} ≥ ηd,
Pr{σn
√
Γdtanθ − ˆhI,duR − ˆhR,duI − eR,duI − eI,duR
−( ˆhR,duR − ˆhI,duI + eR,duR − eI,duI)tanθ ≤ 0|ed} ≥ ηd.
(8)
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9We now handle the first inequality in (8), which equals to Pr{aTd,1[uR;uI ] ≤ −σn
√
Γdtanθ|ed}
≥ ηd, where ad,1 = [ ˆhI,d− ˆhR,dtanθ+eI,d−eR,dtanθ; ˆhR,d+ ˆhI,dtanθ+eR,d+eI,dtanθ]. It is easy
to obtain that the N -dimensional normal distributed vector ad,1’s expectation is ad,1 = [ ˆhI,d −
ˆhR,dtanθ, ˆhR,d+ ˆhI,dtanθ] with covariance matrix Θd,1 = diag((1 + tanθ)2σ2e , ..., (1 + tanθ)
2σ2e︸ ︷︷ ︸
2N
).
Hence, we know that
Pr{ aTd,1[uR;uI ] ≤ −σn
√
Γdtanθ|ed} ≥ ηd ⇒
Pr{a
T
d,1[uR;uI ]− ad,1T [uR;uI ]
||Θ 12d,1[uR;uI ]||2
≤ −σn
√
Γdtanθ − ad,1T [uR;uI ]
||Θ 12d,1[uR;uI ]||2
|ed} ≥ ηd ⇒
Φ(
−σn
√
Γdtanθ − ad,1T [uR;uI ]
||Θ 12d,1[uR;uI ]||2
) ≥ ηd,
(9)
where Φ(x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt denotes the cumulative probability function (cdf) of a standard
normal distributed variable. Defining Φ−1(.) as the inverse function of Φ(.), (9) can be finally
derived into a quadratic constraint
ad,1
T [uR;uI ] + Φ
−1(ηd)||Θ
1
2
d,1[uR;uI ]||2 ≤ −σn
√
Γdtanθ, (10)
Similarly, the second equation in (8) can be given as
ad,2
T [uR,uI ] + Φ
−1(ηd)||Θ
1
2
2 [uR,uI ]||2 ≤ −σn
√
Γdtanθ. (11)
where ad,2 = [− ˆhI,d− ˆhR,dtanθ;− ˆhR,d+ ˆhI,dtanθ] with covariance matrix calculated as Θd,2 =
diag((1 + tanθ)2σ2e , ..., (1 + tanθ)
2σ2e︸ ︷︷ ︸
2N
). Hence, the IR’s probabilistic SINR constraint in (C3) is
equivalent to the following two inequalities
ad,1
T [uR,uI ] + Φ
−1(ηd)||Θ
1
2
d,1[uR,uI ]||2 ≤ −σn
√
Γdtanθ,
ad,2
T [uR,uI ] + Φ
−1(ηd)||Θ
1
2
d,2[uR,uI ]||2 ≤ −σn
√
Γdtanθ,
(12)
We now handle the security constraint against the k-th Eve in (C4) under the provision of
destructive interference. According to the geometric interpretation, confining the k-th Eve in the
destructive region equals to |={hTku}| ≥
(
<{hTku}−σn
√
Γk
)
tanθ. Hence, the constraint (C4)
holds if the two constraints in (13) are simultaneously satisfied
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
Pr{aTk,1[uR;uI ] ≤ σn
√
Γktanθ|ek} ≥ ηk.
Pr{aTk,2[uR;uI ] ≤ σn
√
Γktanθ|ek} ≥ ηk.
(13)
where ak,1 = [ ˆhI,k + ˆhR,ktanθ+ eI,k + eR,ktanθ; ˆhR,k− ˆhI,ktanθ+ eR,k− eI,ktanθ] and ak,2 =
[− ˆhI,k + ˆhR,ktanθ−eI,k +eR,ktanθ;− ˆhR,k− ˆhI,ktanθ−eR,k−eI,ktanθ]. Then the probabilistic
constraint (C4) can be transformed into
ak,1
T [uR;uI ] + Φ
−1(ηk)||Θ
1
2
k,1[uR;uI ]||2 ≤ σn
√
Γktanθ,
ak,2
T [uR;uI ] + Φ
−1(ηk)||Θ
1
2
k,2[uR;uI ]||2 ≤ σn
√
Γktanθ,
(14)
where ak,1 = [ ˆhI,k+ ˆhR,ktanθ, ˆhR,k− ˆhI,ktanθ] and ak,2 = [− ˆhI,k+ ˆhR,ktanθ,− ˆhR,k− ˆhI,ktanθ]
with covariance matrix Θk,1 = Θk,2 = diag((1 + tanθ)2σ2e , ..., (1 + tanθ)
2σ2e︸ ︷︷ ︸
2N
).
After a series of transformation, the probabilistic constraints (C3) and (C4) in P1(imperfect-
prob) are transformed into the corresponding quadratic constraints in (12) and (14). The opti-
mization problem P1(imperfect-prob) can be re-formulated as
P2 (imperfect− prob) : argmin
u,tn,n∈N
||u||2
α
+
N∑
n=1
(
tnpon + (1− tn)poff
)
,
s.t (C1) : 0 ≤ |un|2 ≤ tnpDA,∀n ∈ N, (C2) : tn = {0, 1},∀n ∈ N, (C3) : (12), (C4) : (14),∀k ∈ K.
(15)
According to Schur Complements that ||Ax+b||2 ≤ eTx+d is equivalent to
[
(eTx+d)I Ax+b
(Ax+b)T eTx+d
]

0 [30], the constraints (C3) and (C4) can be further transformed into (16) and (17), respectively.

(
−ad,1T [uR,uI ]−σn
√
Γdtanθ
)
I
Φ−1(ηd)
Θ
1
2
d,1[uR,uI ]
(Θ
1
2
d,1[uR,uI ])
T
(
−ad,1T [uR,uI ]−σn
√
Γdtanθ
)
Φ−1(ηd)
  0,

(
−ad,2T [uR,uI ]−σn
√
Γdtanθ
)
I
Φ−1(ηd)
Θ
1
2
d,2[uR,uI ]
(Θ
1
2
d,2[uR,uI ])
T
(
−ad,2T [uR,uI ]−σn
√
Γdtanθ
)
Φ−1(ηd)
  0
(16)
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

(
−ak,1T [uR,uI ]+σn
√
Γktanθ
)
I
Φ−1(ηk)
Θ
1
2
k,1[uR,uI ]
(Θ
1
2
k,1[uR,uI ])
T
(
−ak,1T [uR,uI ]+σn
√
Γktanθ
)
Φ−1(ηk)
  0,

(
−ak,2T [uR,uI ]+σn
√
Γktanθ
)
I
Φ−1(ηk)
Θ
1
2
k,2[uR,uI ]
(Θ
1
2
k,2[uR,uI ])
T
(
−ak,2T [uR,uI ]+σn
√
Γktanθ
)
Φ−1(ηk)
  0
(17)
Defining U = uHu, P2(imperfect-prob) is further transformed to
P3 (imperfect− prob) : argmin
u,t
Tr(U)
α
+
N∑
n=1
(
tnpon + (1− tn)poff
)
,
s.t (C1) : Tr(UFn) ≤ tnpDA,∀n ∈ N, (C2), (C3) : (16), (C4) : (17),∀k ∈ K,
(C5) :
U u
uT 1
  0, (C6) : U  0.
(18)
where Fn = diag(0...0︸︷︷︸
n−1
, 1, 0, ...0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−n
) is an auxiliary diagonal matrix whose elements are zero except
the n-th element, ∀k ∈ K. The optimization problem in (18) is still non-convex due to the binary
variables in (C2) : tn = {0, 1},∀n ∈ N , which can be relaxed to the following two constraints
[31]
(C2a) : tn = [0, 1],∀n ∈ N, (C2b) :
N∑
n=1
tn −
N∑
n=1
t2n ≤ 0. (19)
where (C2a) is the relaxed version of the original constraint, and (C2b) confines the value
of tn close to 0 or 1. Introducing a penalty factor ϕ, typically of large value, and moving
(C2b) into the objective function, the objective becomes into
Tr(U)
α
+
∑N
n=1
(
tnpon + (1 −
tn)poff
)
+ϕ
(∑N
n=1 tn−
∑N
n=1 t
2
n
)
, which shares the same optimal design policy and result with
the original problem [31]. The last difficulty lies in the non-convex term ϕ(
∑N
n=1 tn−
∑N
n=1 t
2
n)
in the objective term. It can be observed that
∑N
n=1 tn−
∑N
n=1 t
2
n is the difference of two convex
functions w.r.t the variable tn, and thus can be handled by successive convex approximation such
that
∑N
n=1 tn−
∑N
n=1 t
2
n ≤
∑N
n=1 tn−
∑N
n=1(t
(i)
n )2− 2∑Nn=1 t(i)n (tn− t(i)n ), where t(i)n denotes the
value of tn at the i-th iteration [32]. Therefore, the optimization becomes into
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P4 (imperfect− prob) :
argmin
u, t
Tr(U)
α
+
N∑
n=1
(
tnpon + (1− tn)poff
)
+ ϕ
( N∑
n=1
tn −
N∑
n=1
(t(i)n )
2 − 2
N∑
n=1
t(i)n (tn − t(i)n )
)
,
s.t (C1), (C2a) : tn = [0, 1],∀n ∈ N, (C3)− (C6).
(20)
Now P4(imperfect-prob) is a standard semi-definite programming (SDP) problem, which can
be readily solved by CVX. To tighten the approximation, we update the value of t(i)n at each
iteration. The successive convex approximation serves as the upper bound of the original problem,
which is iteratively minimized and also lower bounded by the SINR and physical layer security
constraints. Hence, the convergence of the algorithm is confirmed. Finally, the solver for the
P4(imperfect-prob) in (20) is summarized as follows.
Algorithm 1 DA system with Imperfect CSI and probabilistic robust optimization (DA-imperfect-
prob)
Input: Probabilities thresholds ηd and ηk. SINR requirements Γd and Γk. Estimated CSI hˆd, hˆk, ∀k ∈ K, and power
consumption parameters α, pon, poff , pDA.
Output: Optimal precoding u and DA selection t.
1: repeat
2: Solve optimization problem P4(imperfect-prob) in (20).
3: t(i)n = tn,∀ n ∈ N .
4: i = i+ 1.
5: until Convergence
Remark 1: Now we revisit the inequalities in (12). Since the 2-norm term ||Θ
1
2
d,1[uR,uI ]||2 ≥ 0
always holds, the first inequality in (12) actually contains two inequalities (also applicable for
the second inequality in (12))
− ad,1T [uR,uI ] ≥ σn
√
Γdtanθ, ||Θ
1
2
d,1[uR,uI ]||2 ≤
−ad,1T [uR,uI ]− σn
√
Γdtanθ
Φ−1(ηd)
, (21)
where the first inequality of (21) suggests that the magnitude of u should be large enough while
the second inequality of (21) suggests that the magnitude of u should be smaller enough to
make the (21) holds. Hence, given a high channel estimation error (the norm of matrix Θ
1
2
d,1 is
large), the value of ηd or Γd needs to be properly reduced to make the optimization feasible.
Remark 2: Revisiting the constraint for the k-th Eve in (14), we get
||Θ 12k,1[uR,uI ]||2 ≤
σn
√
Γktanθ − ak,1T [uR,uI ]
Φ−1(ηk)
, ak,1
T [uR,uI ] ≤ σn
√
Γktanθ, (22)
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where only upper bounds on the magnitude of u are imposed. As a result, the constraint itself
always confines a feasible region.
B. Deterministic Robust Optimization
In the previous subsection, we have solved the problem in a probabilistic manner, where the
IR’s QoS requirement and the physical layer security against Eves are issued by the chance
constrained formulations. In this section, we handle the CSI uncertainties from a deterministic
manner, where the IR’s QoS requirement and the physical layer security towards the Eves are
satisfied all the time with the infinite CSI uncertainties. Define ∆ as the channel estimation
uncertainties set, which contains all the possible CSI uncertainties and specifies an ellipsoidal
uncertainty region for the estimated CSI [33].
1) Problem Formulation: To process the power minimization problem in terms of determin-
istic robust optimization, the formulation is given as
P5 (imperfect− det) : argmin
w,z,t
||w + ze−jφd ||2
α
+
N∑
n=1
(
tnpon + (1− tn)poff
)
,
s.t (C7) : 0 ≤ |wn + zne−jφd |2 ≤ tnpDA,∀n ∈ N, (C8) : tn = {0, 1},∀n ∈ N,
(C9) : min
ed∈∆
Γd ≥ Γd, (C10) : max
ek∈∆
Γk ≤ Γk, k ∈ K,
(23)
where (C9) and (C10) indicate deterministic SINR requirement for the IR and physical layer
security constraints against Eves, such that the IR’s worst-case SINR and Eves’ best-case SINR
as per the CSI error distribution obey the respective thresholds Γd and Γk, ∀k ∈ K.
2) Optimization Solution: In line with the analysis in previous section and defining w +
ze−jφIR = u, constraint (C9) is equivalent to the following two inequalities

min
ed∈∆
[eI,d − eR,dtanθ; eR,d + eI,dtanθ]T [uR;uI ] + %d,1 ≤ 0,
min
ed∈∆
[−eI,d − eR,dtanθ;−eR,d + eI,dtanθ]T [uR;uI ] + %d,2 ≤ 0,
(24)
where %d,1 = σn
√
Γdtanθ+ ˆhI,duR+ ˆhR,duI− ˆhR,duRtanθ+ ˆhI,duItanθ, %d,2 = σn
√
Γdtanθ−
ˆhI,duR − ˆhR,duI − ˆhR,duRtanθ + ˆhI,duItanθ. We now handle the first inequality of (24). To
facilitate the infinite CSI uncertainties, we transform it into a linear matrix inequality (LMI)
using the following Lemma 1:
Lemma 1 (S-Procedure): Let a function fm(x), m ∈ {1, 2}, be defined as
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fm(x) = x
HAmx+ 2<{bHmx}+ cm (25)
where Am ∈ HN×N , bm ∈ CN×1 and cm ∈ R. The implication f1(x)⇒ f2(x) holds if and only
if there exists an λ such that
λ
A1, b1
bH1 , c1
−
A2, b2
bH2 , c2
  0. (26)
According to S-procedure, we need to guarantee the derivation in (27) hold as the premise
for guaranteeing the first inequality in (24) always hold, which can be given as
[
√
eI,d − eR,dtanθ;
√
eR,d + eI,dtanθ]
T I2N [
√
eI,d − eR,dtanθ;
√
eR,d + eI,dtanθ]− σ2 ≤ 0⇒
[
√
eI,d − eR,dtanθ;
√
eR,d + eI,dtanθ]
Tdiag(uR;uI)[
√
eI,d − eR,dtanθ;
√
eR,d + eI,dtanθ] + %d,1 ≤ 0.
(27)
By applying S-procedure, the derivation in (27) holds if and only if there exists λ such that
the LMI constraint in (28) holds 1
λd,1I2N − diag(uR;uI), 0
0, −λd,1σ2 − %d,1
  0. (28)
Now the first constraint in (24) containing infinite possibilities is transformed into a deter-
ministic LMI constraint. Similarly, the second inequality in (24) can be transformed into
λd,2I2N − diag(uR;uI), 0
0, −λd,2σ2 − %d,2
  0. (29)
Now the constraint (C9) containing infinite possibilities is transformed into two deterministic
LMI inequalities in (28) and (29), respectively. Now we handle the k-th Eve’s constraint in
(C10), which can be re-written in the two following constraints

max
ek∈∆
[eI,k + eR,ktanθ; eR,k − eI,ktanθ]T [uR;uI ] + %k,1 ≤ 0,
max
ek∈∆
[−eI,k + eR,ktanθ;−eR,k − eI,ktanθ]T [uR;uI ] + %k,2 ≤ 0
(30)
1Based on the properties of normal distributed variables, it is easy to obtain that the terms eI,d−eR,dtanθ and eR,d+eI,dtanθ
share the same expectation and variance. Thus, the two terms also share the same uncertainty bound σ2, and the uncertainty
bound σ2 is normally larger than the CSI variance σ2e to include all the uncertainties.
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where %k,1 = ˆhI,kuR+ ˆhR,kuRtanθ+ ˆhR,kuI− ˆhI,kuItanθ−σn
√
Γktanθ, and %k,2 = − ˆhI,kuR+
ˆhR,kuRtanθ− ˆhR,kuI− ˆhI,kuItanθ−σn
√
Γktanθ. Based on S-procedure introduced above, (30)
can be transformed into

λk,1I2N − diag(uR;uI), 0
0T −λk,1σ2 − %k,1
 ,
λk,2I2N − diag(uR;uI), 0
0T −λk,2σ2 − %k,2

(31)
Now the non-convex constraints (C9) and (C10) are replaced by equivalent LMI constraints.
Defining U = uuH , the problem can be transformed as
P6 (imperfect− det) : argmin
w,z,t
Tr(U)
α
+
N∑
n=1
(
tnpon + (1− tn)poff
)
,
s.t (C7) : Tr(UFn) ≤ tnpDA,∀n ∈ N, (C8) : tn = {0, 1},∀n ∈ N,
(C9) : (28) and (29), (C10) : (31),∀k ∈ K, (C11) :
U u
uT 1
  0, (C12) : U  0,
(C13) : λd,1 ≥ 0, (C14) : λd,2 ≥ 0, (C15) : λk,1 ≥ 0, (C16) : λk,2 ≥ 0,∀k ∈ K.
(32)
To handle the binary variable in (C8), we relax it by a real number between [0,1] and add a
penalty factor ϕ in the objective function. Then the whole problem can be given as
P7 (imperfect− det) :
argmin
w,z,t
Tr(U)
α
+
N∑
n=1
(
tnpon + (1− tn)poff
)
+ ϕ
( N∑
n=1
tn −
N∑
n=1
(t(i)n )
2 − 2
N∑
n=1
t(i)n (tn − t(i)n )
)
,
s.t (C7), (C8) : tn ∈ [0, 1], (C9)− (C16).
(33)
Now the solver for the deterministic robust optimization problem is summarized as follows.
IV. POWER EFFICIENT DA SELECTION AND PRECODING WITH UNKNOWN EVES’ CSI
In a number of practical scenarios, it is impossible to obtain Eves’ CSI information. In this
section, we investigate physical layer security issue when imperfect CSI is only available for the
IR while the Eves’ CSI is completely unknown. Again, we solve the problem in probabilistic
and deterministic manners.
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Algorithm 2 DA systems with Imperfect CSI and deterministic robust optimization (DA-
imperfect-det)
Input: SINR requirements Γd and Γk. Estimated channel hˆd, hˆk, ∀k ∈ K. Power consumption parameters α, pon, poff , pDA.
Output: Optimal precoding u and DAs activation/deactivation t.
1: repeat
2: Solve optimization problem P4 in (33).
3: t(i)n = tn,∀ n ∈ N .
4: i = i+ 1.
5: until Convergence
A. Probabilistic Robust Optimization
Since the IR’ CSI can be imperfectly obtained, we can still guarantee the IR’ SINR requirement
by a probabilistic constraint. However, to address physical layer security in absence of any Eves’
CSI, we can only set a minimum power level of AN.
1) Problem Formulation: To minimize the total power consumption subjected to the IR’s
SINR constraint and Eves’ security constraints, the problem is formulated as
P8 (unknown− prob) : argmin
w, z, t
||w + ze−jφd ||2
α
+
N∑
n=1
(
tnpon + (1− tn)poff
)
,
s.t (C17) : 0 ≤ |wn + zne−jφd |2 ≤ tnpDA,∀n ∈ N, (C18) : tn = {0, 1},∀n ∈ N,
(C19) : Pr{ Γd ≥ Γd|ed} ≥ ηd, (C20) : ||z||2 ≥ PAN ,
(34)
where constraint (C20) is imposed to guarantee the minimum power level of AN and is of
importance when Eves’ CSI is unknown [34].
2) Optimization Solution: To solve the problem, we transform the probabilistic constraint
(C19) into equivalent LMI constraints as we did in the previous section. Define u = w+ze−jφd ,
U = uHu and Z = zHz. The problem is given by
P9 (unknown− prob) : argmin
w,z,t
Tr(U)
α
+
N∑
n=1
(
tnpon + (1− tn)poff
)
s.t (C17) : Tr(UFn) ≤ tnpDA,∀n ∈ N, (C18). (C19) : (16), (C20) : Tr(Z) ≥ pAN ,
(C21) : Tr(ZFn) ≤ Tr(UFn), (C22) : w + ze−jφd = u,
(C23) :
U u
uT 1
  0, (C24) :
Z z
zT 1
  0, (C25) : U  0, (C26) : Z  0.
(35)
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where constraint (C21) is imposed to guarantee that the AN generated on each DA is lower
than the overall beamformer weight. Then we relax the binary variable tn, ∀k ∈ K (C18) into a
real value between [0,1] and add a penalty factor ϕ into the objective function. The transformed
problem is given as
P10 (unknown− prob) :
argmin
w,z,t
Tr(U)
α
+
N∑
n=1
(
tnpon + (1− tn)poff
)
+ ϕ
( N∑
n=1
tn −
N∑
n=1
(t(i)n )
2 − 2
N∑
n=1
t(i)n (tn − t(i)n )
)
,
s.t (C17), (C18) : tn = [0, 1],∀n ∈ N, (C9)− (C26).
(36)
By iteratively updating the value of DA selection vector t, the optimization problem can be
readily solved. The solver is summarized in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 DA systems with unknown Eves’ CSI and probabilistic robust optimization (DA-
unknown-prob)
Input: Minimum AN power level pAN . Probability threshold ηd. SINR requirement of the IR Γd. Estimated CSI of the IR
hˆd. Power consumption parameters, α, pon, poff , pDA.
Output: Optimal precoding u and DAs activation/deactivation t.
1: repeat
2: Solve optimization problem P2 in (35).
3: t(i)n = tn,∀ n ∈ N .
4: i = i+ 1.
5: until Convergence
B. Deterministic Robust Optimization
Now we present the power efficient design in the deterministic manner, for the case when the
Eves’ CSI is unknown. As discussed above, the IR’s SINR needs to be satisfied with all the CSI
uncertainties. Again, we set a minimum power level of AN to address physical layer security
issue.
1) Problem Formulation: The problem is formulated as
P11 (unknown− det) : argmin
w,z,t
||w + ze−jφd ||2
α
+
N∑
n=1
(
tnpon + (1− tn)poff
)
,
s.t (C27) : 0 ≤ |wn + zne−jφd |2 ≤ tnpDA,∀n ∈ N, (C28) : tn = {0, 1},∀n ∈ N,
(C29) : min
ed∈∆
Γd ≥ Γd, (C30) : ||z||2 ≥ PAN ,
(37)
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where (C29) denotes that the minimum possible SINR of the IR should be higher than the
required Γd with all the CSI uncertainties.
2) Optimization Solution: As discussed above, we first transform the constraint (C29) that
contains infinity probabilities into an equivalent LMI by applying S-procedure. Defining w +
ze−jφd = u as well as relaxing the binary variable tn,∀n ∈ N , the transformed problem is given
as
P12 (unknown− det) : argmax
w,z,t
Tr(U)
α
+
N∑
n=1
(
tnpon + (1− tn)poff
)
+ ϕ
( N∑
n=1
tn −
N∑
n=1
(t(i)n )
2 − 2
N∑
n=1
t(i)n (tn − t(i)n )
)
,
s.t (C27) : Tr(UFn) ≤ tnpDA,∀n ∈ N, (C28) : tn = {0, 1},∀n ∈ N, (C29) : (28) and (29),
(C30) : Tr(Z) ≥ pAN , (C31) : Tr(ZFn) ≤ Tr(UFn), (C32) : w + ze−jφd = u,
(C33) :
U u
uT 1
  0, (C34) :
Z z
zT 1
  0, (C35) : U  0, (C36) : Z  0,
(C37) : λd1 ≥ 0, (C38) : λd2 ≥ 0.
(38)
Finally, the solver is given by Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 DA systems with unknown Eves’ CSI and deterministic robust optimization (DA-
unknown-det)
Input: CSI error bound σ2. Minimum AN power level pAN . SINR requirement of the IR Γd. Estimated CSI of the IR hˆd.
Power consumption parameters α, pon, poff , pDA.
Output: Optimal precoding u and DAs activation/deactivation t.
1: repeat
2: Solve optimization problem P2 in (35).
3: t(i)n = tn,∀ n ∈ N .
4: i = i+ 1.
5: until Convergence
V. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
In this section we analytically examine the computational complexity of the proposed al-
gorithms, and benchmark them against the closely related schemes in [3], [28]. For a fair
comparison, the parameters in [3] [28] have been modified to be consistent (the same number
of users and antennas). It can be seen that the proposed algorithm runs in an iterative manner,
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and we have several LMI and linear inequalities to handle in each iteration. For the interior-
point methods based solver, the overall complexity can be given as ln(1

)li
√
cb(cf + cg) [35].
Specifically, ln(1

) relates to the accuracy setup. li represents the number of iterations for updating
DA selection vector.
√
cb represents the barrier parameter measuring the geometric complexity
of the conic constraints. cf and cg represent the complexities cost on forming and factorization
of n× n matrix of the linear system 2.
We first investigate the algorithm’s complexity when the IR and Eves’ CSI is imperfectly
obtained. For the DA-imperfect-prob algorithm in (20), it involves with N LMI (trace) in (C1)
of size 1, 2N linear inequality in (C2), 2 LMI in (C3) of size 2N + 1, 2K LMI in (C4) of
size 2N + 1, 1 LMI in (C5) of size N + 1 and 1 LMI in (C6) of size N . Hence, the proposed
algorithm has cb = (9N + 3) + 2K(2N + 1), cf = n(3N + N3 + (N + 1)3 + (2K + 2)(2N +
1)3 +n2(3N +N2 + (N + 1)2 + (2 + 2K)(2N + 1)2), and cg = n3 (Eq. (18)-(19), [35]). For the
deterministic optimization problem in (33), it involves with N LMI (trace) in (C7) of size 1,
2N linear inequalities in (C8), 2 LMI inequalities in (C9) of size 2N + 1, 2K LMI inequalities
in (C10) of size 2N + 1, 1 LMI inequality in (C11) of size N + 1, 1 LMI inequality in (C12)
of size N , and 2 + 2K linear inequalities in constraints (C13) − C(16). Hence, the proposed
algorithm has cb = 9N + 2K + 5 + 2K(2N + 1), cf = n(3N + 2 + 2K + (2K + 2)(N + 1)3 +
(N + 1)3 +N3) + n2(3N + 2 + 2K + (2K + 2)(N + 1)2 + (N + 1)2 +N2), and cg = n3.
Now we analyze the complexities with unknown Eves’ CSI. For the probabilistic robust
optimization in (36), it involves with N LMI (trace) in (C17) of size 1, 2N linear constraints in
(C18), 2 LMI (trace) in (C19) of size (2N+1), 1 LMI (trace) in (C20) of size 1, N LMI (trace)
in (C21) of size 1, N linear constraints in (C22), 1 LMI in (C23) of size N+1, 1 LMI in (C24)
of size N + 1, and 2 LMI in (C25) and (C26) of size N, respectively. Hence, the algorithm has
cb = 13N+5, cf = n(5N+2N3+1+2(N+1)3+2(2N+1)3)+n2(5N+2N2+1+2(N+1)2+
2(2N + 1)2), and cg = n3. For the deterministic robust optimization in (38), it involves with N
LMI (trace) in (C27) of size 1, 2N linear constraints in (C28), 2 LMI (trace) in (C29) of size
(2N+1), 1 LMI (trace) in (C30) of size 1, N LMI (trace) in (C31) of size 1, N linear constraints
in (C32), 1 LMI in (C33) of size N + 1, 1 LMI in (C34) of size N + 1, 2 LMI in (C35) and
2By the interior-point methods based solver, a search direction is found by solving a system of linear equations in n unknowns.
cf is calculated as cf = n
∑P
j=1 k
3
j +n
2∑P
j=1 k
2
j +n
∑m
j=P+1 k
2
j , where kj presents the size of the j-th constraint. Specifically,
the terms n
∑P
j=1 k
3
j + n
2∑P
j=1 k
2
j come from P LMI constraints while the term n
∑m
j=P+1 k
2
j comes from m − P second
order cone constraints in the problem formulation. cg is calculated as cg = n3 (Eq. (18), [35]).
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TABLE I. Complexity analysis, with accuracy factor 
DA-imperfect-prob Cip = ln( 1 )li
√
(9N + 3) + 2K(2N + 1)[n(3N +N3 + (N + 1)3 + (2 + 2K)(2N + 1)3)
+n2(3N +N2 + (N + 1)2 + (2 + 2K)(2N + 1)2) + n3],where n = O(N +N2)
DA-imperfect-det Cid = ln( 1 )li
√
9N + 4K + 5 + 4K2N [n(3N + 2 + 2K + (2 + 2K)(2N + 1)3
+(N + 1)3 +N3) + n2(3N + 2 + 2K + (2K + 2)(N + 1)2 + (N + 1)2 +N2) + n3
DA-unknown-prob Cup = ln( 1 )li
√
13N + 5[n(5N + 2N3 + 1 + 2(N + 1)3 + 2(2N + 1)3)
+n2(5N + 1 + 2N2 + 2(N + 1)2 + 2(2N + 1)2) + n3]
DA-unknown-det Cud = ln( 1 )li
√
13N + 7[n(5N + 3 + 2N3 + 2(N + 1)3 + 2(2N + 1)3)
+n2(5N + 3 + 2N2 + 2(N + 1)2 + 2(2N + 1)2) + n3]
CA-no-AS [28] ln( 1

)
√
(4 + 4K)[n(8N2 + 8KN2) + n3] , where n = O(2N)
DA-conv-AN [3] ln( 1

)lite
√
2NL[(1 + 2K + 3L)(2NL)3 + (2NL)2(1 + 2K + 3L)2 + (1 + 2K + 3L)3].
(C36) of size N, 2 linear constraints in (C37) and (C38). Hence, the algorithm has cb = 13N+7,
cf = n(5N +3+2N
3+2(N +1)3+2(2N +1)3)+n2(5N +3+2N2+2(N +1)2+2(2N +1)2),
and cg = n3.
Finally, the overall complexities of the proposed algorithms are summarized in TABLE I. It is
observed that the proposed algorithms have polynomial time computational complexity. Given
that the number of iterations li for updating DA section vector is low, the proposed algorithms
can converge rapidly and this will be further demonstrated in the simulation section. Besides, it
can be observed that, compared to the probabilistic robust optimization, the deterministic robust
optimization has 2+2K more linear inequalities in the first scenario and 2 more linear inequalities
in the second scenario. However, the additional linear inequalities have minimal impact on the
complexities as they only linearly increases with the number of users.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
We present the simulated performance in this section. The central frequency is set to 2 GHz
with 1 MHz bandwidth. The AWGN power spectral density is -174 dBm/Hz. A 100× 100 m2
square cell model is considered with N = 16 DAs, where the multiple DAs are uniformly fixed
[5] across the map. The number of the Eves K = 14. The IR and Eves are randomly distributed
across the map. To further highlight the advantages of the DA deployment, in Figs. 4, 7 and
8, subsets of the IR and Eves are partially placed at the coverage edge. DE of all PAs is set
to α = 40%. Power consumption parameters are set to pon = 500 mW, poff = 50 mW, and
pDA = 1000 mW, respectively. CSI error is set to σd = σk = 0.01. The PL model in [36]
is adopted. Besides, the CA MISO system without antenna selection (CA-no-AS) in [28] and
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Fig. 3. Impact of the IR’s SINR requirement Γd on the total power consumption, where Γk = −10 dB, ηd = ηk = 0.95, and
pAN = 25 dBm.
the DA system with conventional AN (DA-conv-AN) in [3] are selected as benchmarks. We
also apply the proposed algorithms to CA systems, which are referred as CA-imperfect-prob,
CA-imperfect-det, CA-unknown-prob and CA-unknown-det respectively in simulation, and the
multiple antennas of CA systems are co-located in the map center.
A. Proposed Algorithms vs Benchmarks
Fig. 3 shows the impact of the IR’s SINR requirement Γd on the total power consumption with
a random IR and Eve deployment. Firstly, it can be seen that the proposed algorithms outperform
the two benchmarks, namely CA-no-AS and DA-conv-AN. It is because the proposed algorithms
benefit from DAs’ activation/deactivation, the DAs far from the users may be deactivated for
saving power. Hence, the proposed algorithms achieve a user-centric and on-demand network
structure with higher degree of freedom over the CA-no-AS algorithm in [28]. Besides, our
proposed algorithms rotate AN to make it constructive to the IR even with imperfect CSI,
while AN is treated as an undesired element at the IR by conventional DA-conv-AN in [3].
Secondly, benefiting from geometric distribution of the DAs, the distances between the DAs
and users are shortened and the DA systems can always find near antennas to serve the users.
With the alleviated PL, DA can outperform its counterpart CA in terms of power efficient
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Fig. 4. (a) Impact of the percentage of edge on total power consumption. (b) Power consumption increment (dB) of DA and
CA systems with different percentages of edge users, where Γd = 20 dB, Γk = −10 dB, ηd = ηk = 0.95, and pAN = 25
dBm.
transmission. Thirdly, increasing the SINR threshold Γd leads to higher power consumption, as
more antennas become activated and dissipate higher circuit and transmission power. Also, the
power consumption of the CA-no-AS increases slowly as the increased transmission power is
overwhelmed by its circuit power consumption. Fourthly, when the Eves’ CSI in completely
unknown, more power is dissipated compared to the scenario that the Eves’ CSI is imperfectly
obtained. It is because to address physical layer security, a minimum AN power level pAN is
required, which is not efficient compared to the scenario that Eves’ CSI is imperfectly obtained.
Fig. 4 (a) shows the total power consumption with different percentages of edge users. It
demonstrates that with more users at edge area, the power consumption of the DA systems
almost remains unchanged regardless of the users’ positions. It is because the geographically
positioned DAs effectively extend the network coverage, and proposed algorithms always activate
near DAs for serving the users. By contrast, the total power consumption of the CA systems keeps
increasing when more users move to edge area. This is because the CA systems have to activate
more antennas and allocate higher transmission power to serve remote users, which inevitably
further improve the total power consumption of CA systems. On the other hand, Fig. 4 (b)
shows the power consumption increment with different percentages of edge users, benchmarked
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by the power consumption with 25% edge users. It is obvious that the power consumption of the
CA systems increases significantly with more edge users, and up to 1.3 dB increment of power
consumption is achieved when all the users are located in the edge area. Besides, it is worthy
noting that the power consumption increment of the CA-no-AS algorithm is lower than the other
antenna selection-enabled CA systems, since the fully-activated antennas of the CA-no-AS have
dominated the power consumption, which makes the increment less significant.
Fig. 5 shows the impact of the physical layer security requirement Γk on the total power
consumption. Firstly, a stringent physical layer security constraint, such as Γk = 10−3, leads to
higher power consumption compared to a loose physical layer security constraint. It is because
with a stringent constraint, higher power level of AN is needed to make the Eves’ SINR lower
than the requirement Γk. Secondly, since the proposed algorithms efficiently utilize AN as a
constructive element, the power consumption of the proposed algorithms maintain low and the
physical layer security against the Eves can be simultaneously addressed. Thirdly, the DA systems
always consume less power compared to the CA counterparts, benefiting from the user-centric
structure. Fourthly, when the Eves’ CSI is unknown at transmitter, the power consumption is
independent with the value of Γk. Hence, to address a stringent security requirement, one can
properly increase the minimum power level of AN when Eves’ CSI is unknown.
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Fig. 6 shows how the total power consumption is affected by the CSI estimation error. As
can be seen, the power consumption of all the algorithms increases with a higher CSI error. In
particular, for the probabilistic manner optimization, a higher CSI estimation error increases the
norm of Θ
1
2
d,1 and thus the left hand of the first inequality in Eq. (21) also increases, as suggested
by Remark 1. As a result, the amplitude of the precoder (also the transmission power) needs to be
properly improved to make the optimization feasible, resulting in a increased total power. On the
other hand, the deterministic manner robust optimization needs to keep the positive semi-definite
characteristic for the matrices in Eq. (28), (29) and (31). This mathematically requires that all the
leading principal minors in the matrices to be non-negative. Hence, with a higher CSI uncertainty,
the amplitude of precoder (also the transmission power) needs to be property increased. As a
result, the total power consumption of all the deterministic optimization is increased. A similar
upwards trend can be also observed by the CA-no-AS and DA-conv-AN, which process the CSI
uncertainties based on the deterministic manner as well.
Now, in the above Figs. 3-6, we have demonstrated that the proposed algorithms outperform
the benchmarks. Importantly, it is clear from the above results that the proposed algorithms are
most beneficial for edge users. Hence, in Fig. 7 and 8, we hereforth focus our attention on the
scenario where all the IR and Eves are placed at the coverage edge to further highlight the
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advantages of DA deployment.
Fig. 7 shows how the total power consumption is affected by the number of Eves. Firstly, it
can be seen that the DA deployment always outperforms its CA counterpart regardless of the
number of the Eves. For the antenna selection-enabled CA systems, they almost dissipate the
same power compared to the DA-conv-AN benchmark. Although artificial noise can be utilized
by the antenna selection-enabled CA systems, the systems have to allocate higher transmission
power for compensating severe PL, which is exactly avoided by the DA-conv-AN benchmark. As
a result, the advantage of utilizing artificial noise vanishes in the antenna selection-enabled CA
systems, especially in the scenario that all the IR and Eves are located at edge area. Secondly,
higher power for generating AN is required to maintain the physical layer security requirements
when the number of the Eves increases, and thus higher total power consumption is led. Applying
the concept of constructive AN yet pushing the IR’s received symbols to the constructive region,
the weight of precoder w can be interestingly reduced. As a result, the total power consumption
of the proposed algorithms increase slowly with more Eves. By contrast, the two benchmarks
dissipate more total power with the increased number of the Eves, either hindered by the high
circuit power consumption at the multiple antennas (CA-no AS) or underutilized AN at the
IR (DA-conv-AN). Especially for the DA-conv-AN scheme, since artificial noise is treated as
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Fig. 8. (a) Antenna deployment in DA systems, where antennas are geographically distributed. (b) Impact of users’ positions
on antennas’ modes in DA systems. (c) Antenna deployment in CA systems, where antennas are co-located in the map center.
(d) Impact of users’ positions on antennas’ modes in CA systems. Γd = 20 dB and Γk = −10 dB. ηd = ηk = 0.95, and
pAN = 25 dBm.
a harmful element at the IR, its power consumption increases significantly compared to other
schemes. Thirdly, when the Eves’ CSI is completely unaware by the system, the total power
consumption remains unchanged with the increased number of Eves. However, one may preset
a higher power level of pAN to address the physical layer security against the Eves, at the cost
of high power consumption.
Fig. 8 shows how antennas’ modes (activation or deactivation) are affected by the users.
For illustration, we only take the DA-imperfect-prob algorithm as an example due to the space
constraints. It can be seen from Figs. 8(a, b) that by the proposed algorithms, those DAs close
to the users have higher probabilities of working while the central DAs far from the users have
higher probabilities of being deactivated to save power. This is originated that in terms of power
efficient design, letting those DAs far from the users transmit signal is not power efficient. By
contrast, as can be seen in Fig. 8(c, d), the antennas in CA systems have the same probabilities
of being activated or deactivated. It is because the centralized antennas have similar PL to the
users, and their working modes are insensitive to users’ positions.
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Fig. 9. The probabilities of the received symbols of the IR and Eves falling into constructive and destructive regions by the
(a) DA-imperfect-prob, (b) DA-imperfect-det, (c) DA-unknown-prob, (d) DA-unknown-det algorithms, where red dots denote
the received symbols of the Eves and blue dots denote the received symbols of the IR. Γd = 20 dB. Γk = −10 dB, ∀k ∈ K.
ηd = ηk = 0.95 and pAN = 25 dBm.
B. CI Regions and Convergence Behavior
For the DA-imperfect-prob algorithm in Fig. 9(a), it can be seen that in most cases the received
symbols of the IR locate in the constructive region while those of the Eves fall in destructive
region as wanted, satisfying the preset outage probabilities ηd and ηk,∀k ∈ K. This also verifies
that even with DA selection mechanism to save power, the proposed algorithm still successfully
keeps AN constructive for the IR whereas destructive for the Eves. It is because the algorithm
statistically guarantees the IR’s SINR higher than Γd and the Eves’ SINR lower than the security
threshold Γk. Fig. 9(b) shows the probabilities under the DA-imperfect-det algorithm. According
to our analysis in section III-B, the IR’ SINR and Eves’s security constraints should be satisfied
with all the CSI uncertainties. This is verified by the simulation results that the received symbols
of the IR always locate in the constructive region while those of the Eves locate in the destructive
region all the time, which is essentially different from the probabilistic optimization that allows
proper outage occurs. However, as discussed in Fig. 3, this is achieved at the cost of high power
consumption. Differently, Fig. 9(c) and (d) show the probabilities when the Eves’ CSI is unknown
by the system. It can be observed that both probabilistic and deterministic robust optimization
can locate the received symbols of the IR in the constructive region, which means the IR’s SINR
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Fig. 10. Iteration behavior of the proposed algorithms, where Γk = −10 dB, ∀k ∈ K. ηd = ηk = 0.95, and pAN = 25 dBm.
requirement is readily satisfied and AN is also efficiently utilized. Besides, by setting the power
level of AN higher than a threshold pAN , the SINR of the Eves can be controlled lower than a
threshold Γk in most cases, which addresses physical layer security against the Eves.
Fig. 10 shows the convergence behavior of the proposed algorithms for updating antenna
selection vector t. It can be observed that the proposed algorithms are readily converged after 5
iterations, proving the low complexities of the algorithms.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated power minimization problem under physical layer security constraints
for DA systems. Targeting at the two practical scenarios, DA selection vector and precoding
have been jointly optimized in terms of probabilistic and deterministic robust optimizations. By
the chance-constrained formulations as well as the deterministic formulations in the two robust
optimizations, the proposed algorithms are able to satisfy the IR’s QoS and simultaneously
address physical layer security against the Eves. Our simulation results have showed that the
proposed algorithms consume much lower power compared to the CA-no-AS and DA-conv-
AN benchmarks, and low complexities have been confirmed by our computational analysis and
simulation. Furthermore, a flexible and user-centric network structure is featured benefiting from
antenna selection mechanism in DA systems, and the power consumption is maintained at low
level regardless of the users’ positions compared to the CA counterpart.
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